"There's nothing happening. I know people who live there and it's all very quiet and peaceful", said Bernie Ecclestone, the indomitable Formula One's chief.

You got to hand it to him. By insisting on holding the Grand Prix in Bahrain, after more than a year of state repression against largely peaceful protests demanding greater democracy, he's just made sure that the often-forgotten crisis in Bahrain hits the world headlines once again. Opposition groups have called for "Days of Rage" this weekend and the capital Manama is under lockdown amid security concerns.

It all seems almost criminally irresponsible. So why do it? Grand Prix is the flagship project of Bahrain's quest for a global brand, and a lot of money is at stake. But the government also wanted to show the world that the country is back to normal. Only it isn't, as you can see in this latest report on Bahrain by Amnesty International, which suggests little has changed.

Read more on the five reasons why the crisis in Bahrain won't go away: a struggle over power, political rights and economic opportunities, but one made intractable by Sunni-Shiite tension and regional politics.

Photo by Reuters.

See also:

• Bahrain: Shiite Majority, Sunni Rule
• Skull-Crushing in Bahrain, Skulduggery in D.C.
• US Interests in Bahrain

So here we are. First Friday protests since the Syrian government agreed to implement the six-point peace plan of the joint UN-Arab League Envoy Kofi Annan. It's the second day of a fragile ceasefire, which appears to be holding, just about. The tension is razor sharp, but it has been the calmest 48 hours Syria has seen for more than 9 months, since anti-government protests escalated into ever deadlier clashes between Syrian government forces and groups affiliated with the rebel Free Syrian Army.

Putting your money on what's going to happen over the next week is an extremely risky bet. Agreeing to withdraw troops from population centers and cease military operations was a major gamble for President Bashar al-Assad, and I am certain he would never have done it without pressure from Russia and China. The regime fears, quite rightly, that any let up in the crackdown will be used by the protesters to reclaim the streets, while fighters from the Free Syrian Army continue to stock weapons.

The impending "political process" mentioned by the peace plan exists only on paper. My guess is that we'll see a lull in the fighting before any potential negotiations between the Syrian government and the opposition inevitably break down.

Read my new piece on the Free Syrian Army, the first in a series of articles covering the Syrian opposition.

The BBC has revealed new embarassing evidence of UK involvement in the rendition of Libyans suspected of terrorism to the regime of late Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi. The cozy relationship between the West and Qaddafi's secret police during the "war on terror" is of course no secret, but this is the first time a direct link has been established between British intelligence services and Musa Kusa, Qaddafi's spy chief.

A letter dated to 2004 has been discovered in Libya last year,  in which a senior MI6 officer congratulates his Libyan pals on the "arrival of the cargo". The "cargo" in question is no other than Abdel Hakim Belhaj, who last year worked with NATO in bringing down the Qaddafi's regime, and who heads the Tripoli Military Council!

Behaj is suing the UK for its role in his extradition to Libya where he claims he was tortured. How ironic that without the UK turning on Qaddafi in 2011, Belhaj wouldn't become one of the most powerful men in Libya. More juicy detail to follow soon.

Photo by Reuters: Abdel Hakim Belhadj.

Read more on Belhaj in my profile article, and see here for a gripping report on renditions to Libya published by The Guardian.

The Arab League summit in the Iraqi capital Baghdad was probably the last chance for Arab leaders to agree on a common policy toward the uprising in Syria, following several failed attempts at mediation in the crisis. And they failed again. Arab governments took the safe option and backed the peace plan put forward by UN envoy Kofi Annan: a call for a ceasefire, but no joint position on the fate of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his regime.

Bitter divisions between Arab states remain. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council advocate a tough approach to the Syrian regime, Iran's key Arab ally. This position is shared by Jordan, Morocco, and the new governments in Tunisia and Libya. Iraq and Lebanon, whose current governments both enjoy closer ties with Iran, reject sanctions on Assad and refuse to back the Syrian opposition. Egypt, whose energy is sapped by political transition at home, is also wary of direct involvement in Syria.

What next? Assad has accepted the UN peace plan but under the condition that foreign governments stop supporting  armed groups in Syria. Saudis and Qataris have earlier called for military assistance  to the Syrian opposition and I don't think they will back off. But whatever course the Gulf Arabs take, they will certainly give up on the Arab League and  go it alone.

I go in more detail on why Saudi Arabia supports Syrian opposition here: "Saudi Arabia and Syrian Uprising".

Photo by AFP: Arab League leaders and envoys in Baghdad, Iraq, March 2012

See also:

• Syrian Uprising: Why is there an uprising in Syria?
• Another Score for Qatar's Foreign Policy: Hamas Leaves Syria

The latest headlines on Syria have been stolen by a group of activists who beat Syria's infamous intelligence services at their own game: hacking the personal e-mail correspondence of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Allow me a spoiler: Assad comes across just as uninspiring and dull as his speeches. The e-mails portray a middle-aged man downloading mainstream pop music, exchanging jokes about world leaders, and sending love messages to his wife. You can find all about Assad's exploits here.

More impressive than Assad's personal life is the ingenuity of Syrian activists, unrelenting even as government forces continue their offensive in the north of the country. Incredibly, the coordination of anti-government protests - from the choice of location and video equipment to chants, banners and songs - really does take place in clandestine Facebook groups.

The use of the social media has been a critical element in the Syrian uprising, as you can see in this excellent report on the phenomenon of citizen journalism in Syria by the New York Times.

Photo by AFP: Bashar and Asma al-Assad.

Read more on the root causes of Syrian uprising.

The Human Rights Watch reports that the Syrian military is laying landmines on the borders with Turkey and Lebanon, along the escape routes used by refugees fleeing the conflict in the country. 230 000 people have been displaced by the violence since the begining of anti-government protest in Spring 2011, according to the UN. But only 30,000 have fled abroad, the rest of them dispersed around Syria. Passing through border areas covered with landmines is going to be even more dangerous now, and the humanitarian situation is getting worse by the day.

The population of small towns and villages in the north of the country appears to be subjected to a full-scale punitive campaign by the government forces, as lightly armed rebels loose one stronghold after the other. The Syrian army is clearly sending a message to the rest of the country.

This is beginning to look like Saddam Hussein's crackdown on the Shiite uprising in 1991, although I still can't see how the Syrian government will be able to pin down all the hotbeds of revolt across the country. More misery for the civilian population, that much is sure.

Photo by Mustafa Ozer/AFP/Getty: Syrian refugees arrive in southern Turkey, June 2011.

See also: Syrian Uprising: Why is there an uprising in Syria?

Still remember Iran's Green Movement? The latest report by Amnesty International makes for a depressing read on the fortunes of the reform movement, which in 2009 took on the establishment of the Islamic Republic in protest against the controversial re-election of president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Amnesty has documented a sharp increase in arrest and intimidation of reformist politicians and activists ahead of the parliamentary elections taking place this week.

Is this a repeat of 2009? Not quite. Three years ago Iranians demanding change united around the presidential bid of opposition leader Mir Hossein Mousavi. This time, however, no such figure exists. Mousavi himself is under house arrest, and other reformers have been banned from the polls or cowed into silence.

And neither can Ahmadinejad still serve as the mobilizing target for the opposition. Entering the final year of his last mandate, Ahmadinejad has been dramatically weakened by supreme religious leader Ayatollah Khamenei, who turned against his former protégé after the president attempted to grab more power at the expense of religious authorities.

The real showdown at the polls will be between various conservative factions, with groups loyal to Khamenei expected to come out on top.

Ironically, while providing a model for young Egyptians and Tunisians who went on to overthrow their regimes in early 2011, Iran's Green Movement buckled under the weight of state repression, and has today no clear strategy on how to continue the fight.

Photo by AP: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei addresses a crowd in Tehran, February 2012.

See also:

• Iranian Politics and Elections
• Sunni Arab Regimes and Democracy in Iran

So it has finally happened. After months of nail-biting and wavering, the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas announced today it was leaving Syrian capital Damascus, the seat of its political bureau. The close relationship between the two allies who share a common enemy in Israel, and are both supported by Iran, has soured because of Hamas' unease over the lethal force used by the Syrian regime against anti-government protesters at home.

Of course, supporters of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad won't be too bothered, for they have other reasons to side with the regime. But the big news is that Hamas' political leadership is packing its bags for Qatar's sunny capital, Doha, teasing seasoned Middle East watchers with some mouth-watering geopolitical implications.

Qatar ruler Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani has certainly been pushing the art of diplomacy to the extreme lately. Blessed with vast hydrocarbon wealth, over the years Qatar has been able to juggle between hosting a U.S. military base, enjoying good relations with Iran, and maintaining contacts with Israel while supporting Palestinian groups.

However, since the "Arab Spring" began, Qatar apparently no longer wants to be the Switzerland of the Middle East. After having bankrolled anti-Qaddafi militias in Libya, Qatar is now planning arms shipments to Syrian rebels, going against its erstwhile ally Assad, and angering neighbouring Iran.

What is Sheikh Hamad up to? Qatar may be playing a long game, buying (literally) friendly relations with the most likely winners of the wave of revolts sweeping the Middle East, while keeping the revolution from spreading to its territory, and winning lucrative business contracts from the newly installed governments.

Good old realpolitik. But are Qataris overstepping their reach? They certainly don't lack ambition. Also opening an office in Doha these days are the Afghan Taliban - with the U.S. blessing.

Photo by Reuters : The ubiquitous mediator: Qatari ruler Hamad with Palestinian leaders, Doha, February 2012.

See also:

• Hamas-Israeli Conflict: Background, Primers, FAQs
• Qatar's Triumph

Until the brutal killing, it was like one of those Latin American novels of the 1970s and 80s about dictators long past their prime and power, but not yet past their illusions. He was surviving on rice and spaghetti scrounged from the homes of civilians his henchmen raided day after day, as Muammar el Qaddafi was on the run. He complained about the lack of electricity, the lack of water, according to a close aide. He was urged to leave the country, to give up. He wouldn't consider it.

Of course, he never picked up a gun. They never do. They only pretend to be warriors. Instead, he read. He made phone calls. And his lingering grasp on power cost innumerable more lives than necessary. Then again, 42 years of his rule cost innumerably more unnecessary lives. Until his own was taken by rebels too contemptuous of him, and the law, to bother with niceties.

The videos of his capture and death immediately went viral, of course. But there's been an incredible binge of hypocrisy about his killing, at least from the United States, where judgments piled up about the manner of Qaddafi's death in ways they never did when Osama bin laden was killed even though, in the end, the two killings were not significantly different. Libyan rebels killed Qaddafi more messily. The Navy Seals killed bin laden more surgically. The Libyans had cell phone cameras rolling. The Seals allegedly did not. And of course the Seals got rid of the body before anyone had time to take a closer look, to analyze the bullet wounds, to judge to what extent bin laden was, in fact, summarily executed.

We have to go on the word of nameless Seals who claim bin laden was armed, that the Seals were acting ins elf-defense. Qaddafi had his henchmen, his bodyguards. But both men were overwhelmed by force, and both, more likely than not, could have been taken alive, and judged where they should have been: in a court of law, not at the muzzle of a gun by unnamed killers.

This isn't to justify anything either did. But it does speak badly of those who killed them. I go in more details here: "Beyond Qaddafi's Death in Libya."

See Also:

• Qaddafi: The Profile
• Bin laden and Qaddafi
• When Ronald Reagan Called Qaddafi the Mad Dog of the Middle East

To answer the question in the headline: not in so many words. But Just about the entire relationship between Pakistan and the United States since 2001 can be defined by those five words: not in so many words. Pakistan has reaped the monetary benefits of an alliance with the United States, cashing in on more than $12 billion, without quite acting like an ally in return. Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (its combination CIA-FBI) never seriously abandoned its loyalty to the Taliban, which it created in the 1990s as a hedge against Indian influence in Afghanistan.

Pakistan had the experience of 1989, when, after the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, the Americans lost interest in what until then had been a well-funded CIA proxy war on Afghan soil, by way of Pakistan. Pakistan has no reason to think the same thing won't happen again, as indeed it has with the killing of Osama bin laden and the American public's weariness with the war in Afghanistan.

But Pakistan's sense of abandonment on that account is self-inflicted. Just last year, Congress passed a Pakistani aid package worth $7.5 billion over five years. Then bin Laden was discovered and assassinated in his laird in Abbottabad, just north of Rawalpindi, the Pakistani military establishment's capital. It is almost impossible to think that al-Qaeda's leader lived there five years without some knowledge, at some level, by Pakistani authorities. It's par for Pakistanis' course: they helped him escape from Tora Bora in 2001. They helped him escape from prying eyes for the past five years, maybe more. Chances are that bin Laden had been in Pakistan for the past decade.

It's all been a double game.

Now American forces along the Afghan-Pakistani border are taking fire from insurgents who either step onto Afghan territory to fire their 105 mm shells or do so from inside Pakistan. The attacks have surged in 2011, as documented by The New York Times, and American military officials say that the level of command and control exhibited by the attacks is too sophisticated not to be backed up by the Pakistani military. Those officials are also angry at the rules in place: no firing back at Pakistani-based positions.

That, of course, is deceptive, too: Just as attacks on American forces from Pakistani bases have increased, so have attacks by American drones vastly increased on Pakistani targets. There's a tit-for-tat war going on, with each side choosing to tell only half the story. Strictly speaking, neither side is acting according to the rules of war. But the rules of war have never really prevailed in Afghanistan, which long ago ceased being, on the American side, a war against terrorism. It turned instead into a counter-insurgency, an insinuation into a civil war fudged as a battle against terrorism. But al-Qaeda is all but eradicated. And the Taliban is no al-Qaeda. It has no interest in attacking the United States or Europe or spreading its caliphate anywhere but in Afghanistan.

It's the Americans who are the strangers in the mix. They'll continue to be. Until, like every other invading foreign force on Afghan soil since the days of Alexander the great, they, too, are forced to leave.

See Also:

• Are US Troops Operating in Pakistan?
• About Those US Missile Strikes in Pakistan...
• Predators Among Them: Why Al-Qaeda Is Lashing Out