Israel's 2006 Blunder
Stubborn, embattled, unrepentant:Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, once the youngest member of the Israeli parliament, managed to become Israel's most reviled politician. The conclusions of the Winograd Commission aren't about to fluff up his image. Yet he hangs on--and his poll ratings are rising. (Gil Cohen/Pool/Getty Images)
Too much wagered, nothing gained: That's what the 500 pages of the Winograd Commission report on Israel's handling of the 2006 war in Lebanon come down to. The war was badly planned, it lacked a clear objective, the military was ill prepared (down to shoddy equipment that endangered soldiers in the field), it had no exit strategy other than sheer retreat. For all that, Hezbollah never stopped raining rockets on northern Israel, and the two Israeli soldiers Hezbollah captured (catapulting it toward confrontation with Israel) were never recovered.
Today, 17 months after the war, Hezbollah's missile arsenal is as deadly as ever, Hezbollah is more popular in Lebanon (and in the Middle East) than it was before the war, and Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, feels confident enough to peek out for a cameo during a recent Ashura commemoration to taunt Israel, quite graphically, about various body parts of Israeli soldiers in Hezbollah's possession.
For Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, it should be the final straw of an unstoried, dismal tenure since he took over for Ariel Sharon following Sharon's stroke in January 2006. Olmert has been savaged by the Israeli public and the commission for his handling of the war, he's been under various investigations for corruption, his approval rating bottomed out at 3 percent, and yet: here he is, hanging on and pledging to stay on, although this time it may not be up to him anymore. Olmert's Kadima Party coalition is hanging by an ember in the Knesset (the Israeli parliament) as its coalition partners are ready to bail. They don't want to be further sullied by the report's findings.
Then again, the Jerusalem Post soon after the release of the commission's conclusions was reporting that Olmert's approval rating was on the rise. The poll, conducted by the Israeli newspaper Ma'ariv, found that
42 percent of those polled preferred Olmert's government to stay in power until the end of its term or an earlier date agreed upon in advance. 27%, however, thought new elections should be held as soon as possible. Additionally, 39% of respondents said that if Olmert didn't resign, Labor leader and Defense Minister Ehud Barak should pull Labor out of the government and bring about new elections. 22% said Barak should remain in Olmert's coalition and a similar number of respondents thought Barak should remain in the coalition but only after setting a date for new elections in approximately a year's time.It isn't all insider politics. Olmert is a crucial partner in President Bush's hopes for a breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. But Bush knew about Olmert's febrile political state going into his recent tour of the Middle East. In Israel, the sense is that for all of Olmert's astounding ability to weather attacks and unpopularity, this may well be the end for him, at least for now (Israeli politicians make it a habit of rivaling Phoenix in plumage).
The Winograd commission report, at any rate, is more about Israel--its misguided assumptions in 2006, its options since--than about Olmert. The report's subtext is also about a reckoning: Israel's options against an indigenous guerilla force like Hezbollah are very, very limited.
Unlike the PLO (which Israel successfully expelled from South Lebanon in 1982) Hezbollah is a Lebanese product. It's funded and armed by Iran and Syria, but its fighters are Lebanese, and its backing is the entrenched Shiite community of South Lebanon. It cannot be excised, least of all by force, which only burnishes Hezbollah's image as a "resistance" organization.
Which is what makes the Winograd report such fascinating reading, and its conclusion--too much wagered, nothing gained--so pre-ordained. It's 500 pages long and in Hebrew. No worries: the summaries are in English. And you can skip it all and read my analysis.
Read All About the Winograd Commission report and Its Context:
Comments
Pierre,
I very much doubt that the 2006 invasion’s real objective was to rescue two soldiers. Such arrests (here and in Israel it is called kidnapping) of Israeli’s soldiers had happened before, and were resolved through negotiation. I think the reason was one or a combination of the following;
* US desire to divert attention from the quagmire in Iraq.
* US desire to clip the wings of Iran and Syria.
* Israel’s self-induced image of invincibility and reckless arrogance: we can do it, so let’s do it.
* Israel’s desire to teach Iran, Syria and the rest of ME who the regional superpower is.
* Israel’s determination to wipe out its deadliest and most resilient enemy.
They never thought that Hezbollah has any chance, even though the latter kicked the shit of them last time they faced each other.
Calling a large segment of native people, who fight for their existence and freedom, a terrorist group is the height of hypocrisy and travesty. By that yardstick, the Americans fighting the British were terrorists, so were the Vietnamese, the Chinese fighting the Japanese, the French resistant forces in WW 2, the Serbs fighting the Germans, the Ukrainians fighting the Nazis, and many others. As much as I think religion has caused harm to mankind, nevertheless in the case of Hezbollah it has been a unifying force, a fabric strong enough to hold the Shiias together to withstand and repel a powerful modern military force. I don’t think they are puppets of Iran or Syria. These two countries, for perhaps different reasons, assist and support them, but cannot subjugate them. I have enormous respect and admiration for Hezbollah’s valiant effort. They do what they promise. Despite religion, they seem to have a fair and just socialist system. Their young men and women roll up their sleeves, go out to villages and farms to build homes, schools, roads and hospitals, provide care, and many other crucial services. More power to them.
Pierre,
I very much doubt that the 2006 invasion’s real objective was to rescue two soldiers. Such arrests (here and in Israel it is called kidnapping) of Israeli’s soldiers had happened before, and were resolved through negotiation. I think the reason was one or a combination of the following;
* US desire to divert attention from the quagmire in Iraq.
* US desire to clip the wings of Iran and Syria.
* Israel’s self-induced image of invincibility and reckless arrogance: we can do it, so let’s do it.
* Israel’s desire to teach Iran, Syria and the rest of ME who the regional superpower is.
* Israel’s determination to wipe out its deadliest and most resilient enemy.
They never thought that Hezbollah has any chance, even though the latter kicked the hell of them last time they faced each other.
Calling a large segment of native people, who fight for their existence and freedom, a terrorist group is the height of hypocrisy and travesty. By that yardstick, the Americans fighting the British were terrorists, so were the Vietnamese, the Chinese fighting the Japanese, the French resistant forces in WW 2, the Serbs fighting the Germans, the Ukrainians fighting the Nazis, and many others. As much as I think religion has caused harm to mankind, nevertheless in the case of Hezbollah it has been a unifying force, a fabric strong enough to hold the Shiias together to withstand and repel a powerful modern military force. I don’t think they are puppets of Iran or Syria. These two countries, for perhaps different reasons, assist and support them, but cannot subjugate them. I have enormous respect and admiration for Hezbollah’s valiant effort. They do what they promise. Despite religion, they seem to have a fair and just socialist system. Their young men and women roll up their sleeves, go out to villages and farms to build homes, schools, roads and hospitals, provide care, and many other crucial services. More power to them.