Arguments For
Mismanagement of the war in Afghanistan should not doom the effort's laudable goals, and many tangible successes. Afghanistan is not Iraq. The central government, while mostly limited in authority to Kabul and its surroundings, still enjoys relative credibility. The Taliban regime that ruled Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001 may be re-gaining strength, but its brutal history and repressive means argue for continuing the battle against it and its al-Qaeda allies, not surrendering Afghanistan to its former wardens. The problem in Afghanistan is not a lack of will or an unclear goal. It's a lack of troops and civilian experts to implement a comprehensive security and reconstruction program. Afghans were behind the American-led attack on the Taliban in October 2001. They can be steered behind the American-led efforts of the NATO coalition and Operation Enduring Freedom again.
Arguments Against
In August 2007, The New York Times headlined a front-page story that summed up six years of missed opportunities: "How the 'Good War' in Afghanistan Went Bad." The Taliban has steadily regained strength in several parts of the country. Afghans' hearts and minds have been repeatedly squandered by heavy-handed bombing campaigns that have killed many civilians. Casualty rates for American and coalition soldiers are higher than at any point since 2001. The United Nations reported that opium cultivation in Afghanistan grew by 17 percent in 2007, breaking records for the second straight year despite a $600 million American counternarcotics effort. More land is being used for opium production in Afghanistan than land used for coca cultivation in all of Latin America. And in the area east of the Afghan border, in Pakistan’s tribal zones, al-Qaeda and the Taliban operate with near impunity, autonomous from the Pakistani government.
Where it Stands
The American public and the U.S. Congress are in a seriously skeptical mood when it comes to escalating troop deployments abroad. The "surge" in Iraq did not yield the positive results expected. A "surge" in Afghanistan even larger than the one carried out in 2007 would run into political opposition as the United States heads into a presidential election year.
Similarly, NATO member nations face political opposition among their own electorates regarding further deployments either in Iraq or Afghanistan. The likeliest outcome in 2008 is that troop levels in Afghanistan will remain static, preventing western forces from gaining much momentum against the Taliban. Will that result in stalemate? Not exactly. The momentum, for now, is in the Taliban's favor.
