The Issues
Borders: Abbas wants a precise agreement on where Palestinian-Israeli borders will be. That implies talking about the placement of the separation wall, which currently cuts through Palestinian territory well inside the West Bank. Israelis aren’t ready to be that precise.
Recognizing Israel and the Palestinian right of return: Israel wants Palestinians to formally recognize Israel’s right to exist. Palestinians are refusing, because such a recognition amounts to an end of discussions about Palestinian refugees’ right of return to Israel—a right Israel will not open to debate (if Palestinians were granted that right and did return, they would outnumber Israelis in Israel).
Dismantling the Palestinian “Terror Infrastructure”: Abbas wants a six-month deadline for a final status agreement. Olmert doesn’t agree to a hard deadline. He says he’s willing to reach a final status agreement by the end of Bush’s term (in January 2009), but would implement it only “if the Palestinians dismantle terror infrastructure.” Yet Israel hasn’t allowed Palestinian police to operate in such a way as to impose the kind of order Israel wants. The 500-strong Palestinian police force in Nablus is not allowed to chase suspects outside the city limits, and Israeli forces routinely and heavy-handedly invade the city to search out wanted men, usually at night. As a result, Palestinians have little respect for their own police force’s authority.
Dismantling Israeli Settlements: Besides wanting more substantial authority for their police force, Palestinians want their security guarantees to Israel, including the dismantling of the “terror infrastructure,” to parallel Israel’s dismantling of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. There are 274,000 Israelis who live in the West Bank, inside or beyond the separation wall, including in 24 outpost settlements built illegally after March 2001, when Israel was supposed to impose a freeze on settlements. Few people say that Israel will dismantle all settlements, and even Palestinians concede privately that some settlements will always remain. Olmert has been negotiating with some settlers over their removal, but only as part of a plan that would legalize some settlements permanently.
East Jerusalem:Israel has occupied the Arab part of Jerusalem since 1967. About 190,000 Israelis live there. Palestinians see East Jerusalem as their eventual nation’s capital. If an agreement is to be reached between the two sides, one of them will have to give on this searing issue. Israel’s Shas Party, which represent ultra-Orthodox Jews and has 12 members in the 120-member Knesset, the Israeli parliament, teamed up with the opposition Likud Party (which also has 12 members in the Knesset) to pass the first reading of a bill that would require any division of Jerusalem to be approved by at least two-thirds of the Knesset—an almost impossible hurdle.
The Bottom Line
It’s been characteristic of President Bush to aim big and launch into massive initiatives (Iraq abroad, reforming Social Security at home) without preparing the political groundwork. He’s done it again in the run-up to Annapolis, a conference of immense import yet whose date wasn’t set until a week before it would be held.
Reopening Israeli-Palestinian talks after a seven-year hiatus, under American aegis, makes every side look good, at least temporarily. But Bush, a lame-duck president whose fortunes at home and his credibility abroad are already shattered, and whose party’s political fortunes in 2008 look dim, has as little to lose, relatively speaking, as he has political capital to spend.
Not so Israelis and Palestinians. Olmert and Abbas, politically weak as they are, may have little to lose individually. But failure at Annapolis would severely set back the peace process. Palestinians and Israelis would likely be further hardened. As Hamas continues to build up Gaza militarily, an Israeli invasion of the Strip grows likelier. Even if that restores Abbas’ authority there, it would be the kind of authority won in the shadow of Israeli guns and as such wouldn’t endear Abbas to Palestinians.
A miracle is always possible. But as most foreign policy initiatives muscled or brokered by the Bush administration, including declarations of peace and free elections in Iraq and Afghanistan, can be deceiving. What matters is what happens after the ceremonies. For now, the Bush administration appears to have no plan, while the Israelis and the Palestinians seem to have no idea.
